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Abstract
The debate over the impact of regional trade agreements (RTAs) on world welfare hinges upon
(1) whether they are net trade creating or trade diverting and (2) whether they impede multilateral
trade liberalization. Theoretical models are ambiguous on these issues. We summarize the insights
from the vast body of empirical literature on multi-country CGE models which analyze RTAs.
The empirical models overwhelmingly show that aggregate trade creation dominates trade
diversion. Indeed, in many cases, there is no absolute aggregate trade diversion from an RTA. The
models also indicate that welfare for all members — both current and potential — increases when
RTAs expand. There are even bigger welfare gains when models incorporate aspects of “new
trade theory” such as increasing returns, imperfect competition, technology transfers, trade
externalities, and dynamic effects such as links between trade liberalization, total factor
productivity growth, and capital stock accumulation. We broaden the search for large numbers by
suggesting an additional gain from RTAs. We conjecture that increases in intra-sectoral trade
arise from the fact that an RTA provides an expanded secure market, and permits firms to pursue
economies of fine specialization. This Smithian specialization in production is another source of
efficiency gains. See Burfisher and Jones (1998, p. 11, table 1) for a detailed description of the types of
1
regional trade agreements and the degree of integration in each. Vollrath (1998) summarizes the
country composition and agricultural trade policies of six major RTA’s: the European Union
(EU), Closer Economic Relations (CER, between Australia and New Zealand), Canada-U.S. Free
Trade Agreement (CUSTA), Mercosur, ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Free
Trade Area (AFTA), and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Forum, a prospective
RTA. Likewise, Sheffield (1998) describes of country coverage and agricultural trade policies for
a detailed list of RTAs.
1
I. Introduction
In recent years, regional free trade agreements have proliferated.  Some, such as the North
1
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), involve a developing country (Mexico) liberalizing
trade and deepening links with developed countries (the United States and Canada). The
expansion of the European Union (EU) to include, first, countries such as Spain, Portugal, and
Ireland; and, second, central European countries, similarly expands links between developing and
developed countries — although the gaps are not as great as that between Mexico and the U.S.
Other arrangements, such as Mercosur, involved deepening integration among developing
countries. Many of these new regional integration schemes have evolved during the Uruguay
Round of GATT negotiations, which continued the postwar trend of global trade liberalization
and also expanded the sectoral coverage to include agriculture. 
The various approaches to trade liberalization that have emerged in recent years have
revived the debate over the welfare implications of regional trade agreements (RTAs) and their
impact on the global economy. One school of thought [Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996),
Bhagwati and Krueger (1995), Srinivasan (1998)] views RTAs as a bad idea, reducing welfare for
their members and detracting from efforts to expand global liberalization under the new World
Trade Organization (WTO). Others, such as Ethier (1998), argue that RTAs reflect a “new
regionalism” which complements multilateralism and that they are evidence that small countries
want to participate in a multilateral system currently dominated by developed countries. Another
issue is the importance of proximity. Krugman (1993) notes that there are natural trading blocs
among neighboring countries — low transportation costs contribute to welfare gains when these
countries form an RTA. There is also a view that countries seek to join RTAs because of fear of
exclusion — the domino theory of regionalism described by Baldwin and Venables (1995). 
In this debate, there are three important issues which can only be resolved with empirical
models. First, do RTAs increase welfare? Trade theory is ambiguous on this point, noting that
there can be both trade creation which increases welfare and trade diversion which can reduce
welfare. Theory offers few insights as to which change will dominate. Second, where are the big
numbers? Empirical studies of growth in both developing and developed countries support the
view that trade liberalization policies have led to increased trade and have been associated withThis empirical literature is seldom cited by those taking a dim view of RTAs. For
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example, Srinivasan (1998, p. 61) states that the issue of whether or not RTAs are beneficial,
including the crucial question of whether trade creation exceeds trade diversion, “. . . is simply a
set of empirically testable, though as yet untested, hypotheses.” This statement is hard to justify
given the volume of empirical work on this issue. 
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welfare gains and more rapid growth. What are the sources of these gains? Finally, do RTA's
hinder or help multilateral free trade? On this point, empirical models can show the effects of
being excluded from an RTA and also consider the impact on member countries of joining an
RTA compared to further global liberalization. 
In this paper, we summarize empirical evidence of the increased importance of regional
trade. Then we review theoretical and empirical models of RTAs. We also briefly review “new
trade theory” models  which incorporate links between increased trade and economic performance
beyond the standard Ricardian theory of comparative advantage. We then consider the
voluminous empirical literature analyzing the impact of RTAs.  The results from a large number of
2
model-based empirical studies strongly support a few robust conclusions about RTAs: (1) they
increase welfare of participating countries; (2) aggregate trade creation is much larger than trade
diversion; (3) the big numbers appear in models that incorporate features of new trade theory; (4)
there are welfare gains from expanding membership; and (5) global trade liberalization increases
welfare more than the formation of an RTA.
II. Empirical Evidence of Increased Regional Trade
Analysis of trade data found in various studies suggests intra-regional trade has become
more important over time. For example, Frankel, Stein and Wei (1994) find that intra-regional
trade as a share of total trade of the region has increased from 1965 to 1990 among Andean
countries (from 0.8 to 2.6 percent), the EC12 (from 35.8 to 47.1 percent) and East Asian
countries (from 19.9 to 29.3 percent). In addition to examining trends in the data, Frankel and
others use the gravity model to decompose the effects of economic size, distance and the
existence of a regional trade agreement between partners on bilateral trade on trade. They find
that the dummy variables for intra-regional trade are highly statistically significant. They conclude
that, “The gravity model results thus show that statistically significant regional trading
arrangements are indeed springing up in a number of places.” (p. 73). 
Yeats (1998) finds evidence of increased intra-Mercosur trade from 1979–1994, noting
that trade preferences in the region were introduced in June 1991. In some cases, the changes are
dramatic, with Argentina's share of exports to Mercosur countries increasing from 13.4% toYeats (1998) also uses trade data to compute intensity of trade indices which indicate that
3
Mercosur members are becoming more dependent on trade with one another.
The 18 original APEC countries are Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong,
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Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore,
South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and the United States. Russia, Peru and Viet Nam joined in 1998.
The AFTA countries are Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. The
CER countries are Australia and New Zealand, The CUSTA countries are Canada and the United
States. The EU countries are Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. The Mercosur countries are
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay (from Vollrath, 1998)
3
30.4%. Exports from individual Mercosur countries to Europe declined slightly while exports
from these countries to the United States increased slightly over the same time period.  
3
Focusing on agriculture, Vollrath (1998) describes the intra-regional trade patterns for six
regional trade areas — AFTA, APEC, CER, CUSTA, EU, and Mercosur.  He finds that the
4
countries included in these RTAs account for a stable share of global agricultural trade from 1970
- 95. However, collectively, their share of intra-regional to global trade increased 10% over the
period, suggesting that world agricultural trade has become more regional. Then he examines the
share of intra-regional imports to total imports for each region. He finds an increase in intra-
regional trade in the EU, CUSTA, CER, Mercosur, and APEC. In AFTA, regional trade
dependence in agriculture has declined, as countries have similar endowments and production
patterns and little incentive for agricultural trade among members
Hertel, Masters, and Gehlhar (1997) also describe trends in agricultural trade in RTAs and
find empirical evidence of increased regional trade. They calculate the shares of world trade in
farm goods — grains, oilseeds, fruits and vegetables, sugar, and livestock products — that is
accounted for by intra-regional trade in three trading regions, EU12, NAFTA, and APEC. Over
the 1962-95 period, intra-regional food trade increased in each region (although the gains in
NAFTA are slight). 
In some RTAs, there is evidence that there has been significant increases in intra-industry
trade. For example, this trend has been occurring in trade between the U.S. and Mexico since
Mexico unilaterally liberalized in the mid-1980s, and has accelerated since the formation of
NAFTA. The formation of the European Common Market also led to significant increases in
intra-industry trade [Grubel and Lloyd (1971)]. It is a common observation that much of the
increased trade volume in the world economy has occurred among the developed countries, rather
than between developed and developing countries. In a neoclassical trade model, one would
expect to see more trade between countries with dramatically different factor proportions, but the
“stylized facts” indicate that most trade creation has occurred among countries with relatively
similar factor endowments. In terms of analyzing the impact of the formation of RTAs, one mustWonnacott (1996) notes that trade diversion is not necessarily welfare-decreasing by
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definition. Instead, he argues that trade diversion may increase welfare for the diverting country
and the world as a whole. Trade liberalization between partners in an RTA may lead to increased
competition and specialization; firms can exploit economies of scale when they have a bigger
market and the partner country may become the least cost supplier in this environment. This is
really a “new trade theory” argument. 
Mexico faced these conditions before entering NAFTA — it had a high share of trade
6
with the U.S. and had higher tariffs than the U.S. Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996) argue that this
suggests Mexico will lose from NAFTA because of foregone tariff revenue from trade diversion.
As we will show below, they are wrong. The empirical evidence shows that NAFTA is net trade
creating and that welfare for all members increases.
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keep in mind that wide differences in factor endowments may not be the chief force behind
increases in trade volumes. 
Given the evidence of increased intra-regional trade, the next question is, does this come
at the expense of trade with the rest of the world, as some researchers argue? We next consider
trade creation/ trade diversion issues at the theoretical and empirical levels. 
III. Trade Creation and Trade Diversion
A. Theory
Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996) and Panagariya (1998, 1996) argue that RTAs will likely
reduce welfare in member countries and impede multilateral trade liberalization. Because RTAs
give preferential treatment to member countries, they divert trade from non-member, least-cost
suppliers. They argue that this trade diversion is likely to dominate trade creation, so the RTA will
reduce welfare in member countries.  To illustrate the trade diversion effects of an RTA, they
5
present Viner's model of a customs union in which two countries remove bilateral tariffs. When
the rest of the world is the least cost supplier and faces constant costs, an RTA with the supplier
who faces increasing costs can only divert trade. The liberalizing country loses because it foregoes
tariff revenue from the new union member but does not face a lower internal price for the
imported good, since the rest of the world is the price setter. In this framework, the larger is the
trade partner as a share of total imports, the bigger the tariff revenue loss when an RTA is
formed. Similarly, the trade partner who initially has higher tariffs loses from an RTA because
more tariff revenue is redistributed away from it. 
6
 In contrast, when the union partner is the supplier facing constant costs, an RTA
improves welfare in the liberalizing country. It benefits from the price reduction and still collects
tariff revenue from the countries excluded from the union. There is only trade creation from the
RTA. As Panagariya (1996) notes, this case is even better than multilateral tariff elimination duePanagariya uses a stylized model to argue that NAFTA will cost Mexico, the country
7
with the highest initial tariffs, $3.25 billion in lost tariff revenue per year. 
See also Winters (1996) for a discussion of the theory with models that allow both trade
8
creation and trade diversion.
5
to the tariff revenue collected. However, he argues it is usually the case that the rest of the world,
not the union partner, faces constant costs while union members face increasing costs. While there
will be trade creation for some commodities, the majority of goods will come from a partner with
increasing costs — trade diversion will dominate in most RTAs.
7
De Melo et al. (1993) note that the case of pure trade diversion, emphasized in Panagariya
(1996 and 1998), while unambiguously welfare-worsening, is too extreme a model to characterize
actual RTAs.  They present a more balanced view of the welfare effects of an RTA in an
8
analytical model in which integration both creates and diverts trade. In this case, the country
which lowers its barriers against a trade partner faces a new domestic price which is lower than
the tariff-inclusive mark-up over the constant cost supplier (the rest of the world), but higher than
the free trade price. The welfare effects on the tariff-reducing country are ambiguous: it loses
because it has diverted all imports from the lowest cost supplier, but it benefits because total
imports have increased. De Melo and others note that, in this environment: (1) the higher the
initial tariff on a given sector, the larger the benefits and the smaller the costs of an RTA; (2) the
lower the post-RTA tariff on non-union countries, the less likely that the lower-priced goods of
the latter will be displaced; and (3) the greater the complementarity in import demands between
the union partner, the greater the gains from an RTA. The latter point suggests that there are
large gains from an RTA between developed and developing countries — such as the U.S. and
Mexico — which have different factor endowments. Determining the net welfare impact of an
RTA in this model is an empirical issue. 
Like de Melo et al., De Rosa (1998) provides a balanced survey of theoretical models that
allow for both trade creation and diversion when an RTA is formed either with a partner facing
either constant or increasing cost. In addition to describing the effects of an RTA in Viner’s
partial equilibrium model, De Rosa presents Meade’s model in which both international and
domestic relative prices can adjust in a general equilibrium framework. One result from the Meade
model which is relevant to the debate over trade creation and diversion is that if a country
entering a regional trade agreement increases its imports from all sources, its welfare will
improve. To insure that there is no trade diversion — and hence that the country entering the
RTA can improve its welfare — De Rosa recommends that member countries of a new trading
bloc should simultaneously reduce trade barriers with non-member countries. The idea is
important — formation of an RTA in an environment of continuing multilateral liberalization may
well have different welfare implications than forming an RTA in an increasingly protectionist
environment. We review eight surveys: Baldwin and Venables (1995), 6 studies; Brown (1993), 12
9
studies; Burfisher and Jones (1998), 11 studies; DeRosa (1998) 15 studies; Francois and Shiells
(1994), 10 studies; Hertel (1997) and others 7 studies; U.S. International Trade Commission
(1998) 6 studies; and U.S. International Trade Commission (1992) 10 studies. While there is
some overlap in terms of the models included in these surveys, we draw our conclusions from a
total of 77 studies.
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B. Empirical Evidence
The theoretical models suggest that the net impact of an RTA on trade creation and trade
diversion is ambiguous. It depends on the export capacity of the partner country and whether the
partner country faces constant cost. Furthermore, as Panagariya (1998) notes, an RTA can be net
trade-creating in one sector and net trade-diverting in another sector. To determine the
implications of an RTA for aggregate welfare and trade patterns, one needs economywide, multi-
sectoral, computable general equilibrium (CGE) models. 
There is now a large empirical literature using multi-country CGE models to analyze the
impact of regional trade agreements. We will summarize conclusions from various surveys of this
literature and discuss representative studies.  See Annex 1 for a summary table of results from
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additional models. As we will note below, multi-country CGE models differ widely in terms of
country and commodity coverage, assumed market structure, policy detail, and specification of
macroeconomic closure. In spite of these differences, surveys of these models support two
general conclusions about the empirical effects of regional trade agreements: (1) in aggregate,
trade creation is always much larger than trade diversion; and (2) welfare — measured in terms of
real GDP or equivalent variation — increases for member countries. 
Brown (1993) surveys early CGE models of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA). She describes three classes of models: (1) static models with constant returns to scale
technology and perfectly competitive goods markets (the neoclassical model); (2) static models
with increasing returns to scale; and (3) dynamic models. In the static models with constant
returns to scale technology, there are small welfare gains, measured as an increase in real income,
from the formation of NAFTA. The gains are positive for both countries, but Mexico’s gains are
relatively much bigger. With regards to trade diversion, Brown notes:
“The negative consequences of an agreement for the ROW are not expected to be
very important. U.S. tariffs and nontariff barriers against Mexico are already quite
low, thus minimizing the distortion effects associated with a preferential tariff.
Mexico’s trade barriers are higher, but a very large fraction of Mexico’s trade isBrown's perspective contradicts Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996) who argue that the
10
same conditions — high trade shares with the U.S. and high tariffs — mean Mexico loses from
NAFTA because of trade diversion and the loss of tariff revenue (p. 18). The difference between
the two approaches is the underlying assumption about the analytical model. Brown presumes
both trade creation and trade diversion are possible while Bhagwati and Panagariya presume trade
diversion dominates. 
This report is a critical review and summary of a symposium held at the U.S.
11
International Trade Commission, February 1992. The Symposium was based on a request from
the United States Trade Representative to investigate the technical merits and major findings of
economy-wide modeling of the economic implications of NAFTA.
7
already directed toward the United States. Consequently, there is very little trade
with the ROW to divert.” (p. 40.) 
10
 
The U.S. International Trade Commission (1992) also surveys CGE models of NAFTA.
11
Like Brown (1993), the survey acknowledges the variety of structural features in the models in
terms of the number of sectors, number of primary factors, market structure, macroeconomic
assumptions (model closure), and policy instruments. Despite the diversity of the models, the
report notes that:
 “. . . these studies uniformly demonstrate that all three countries would benefit
from a NAFTA, as shown by increases in welfare and real GDP. Mexico stands to
gain the most, with estimated welfare increases ranging from 0.11 to 5.0 percent.
Mexican real GDP increases by 0.01 to 11.39 percent. The Unites States would
gain 0.07 to 2.55 percent in welfare and real GDP would increase by 0.02 to 2.07
percent. Most studies show smaller gains for Canada than for Mexico, with welfare
changes of 0.03 to 6.75 percent and increases in real GDP ranging from 0.12 to
10.57 percent.” (pps. 6-14).
. 
Francois and Shiells (1994) elaborate upon the features of CGE models used to analyze
NAFTA, noting that the theoretical structure of the models influences the simulation results. They
comment on the differences in demand specifications (Armington versus monopolistic
competition, choice of functional form), market structure (perfect competition versus imperfect
competition), closure rules (international capital mobility, migration, full employment versus fixed
wage, and the trade balance), and inter-temporal structure (static versus dynamic). In terms of
welfare, they find: 
“. . . without exception, simulations based on these models show that Canada,
Mexico and the United States all stand to gain from NAFTA, although the welfare
gains are modest as a percent of GDP. Mexico appears to have the most to gain
with percentage changes in welfare on the order of 1 to 5 percent.” (p. 40).DeRosa describes two cases in which a country modeled or the rest of the world
12
experiences a welfare decline. In Lewis and Robinson (1996) there is a slight decline in China’s
welfare when they model Afta, the elimination of all tarif and nontariff barriers to imports among
Asean countries. In Harrison, Rutherford, and Tarr (1997), Chile experiences a welfare decline
when it joins Mercosur. This can be explained by the high external tariffs Chile must adopt against
the rest of the world.
Their discussion of the CGE models of NAFTA come from the surveys in the U.S.
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International Trade Commission (1992) and Francois and Shiells (1994) which are also described
earlier in this paper.
They note that these studies focus on manufacturing, approximately one third of EC
14
GDP; they may understate the effects of EC92 which also affects services trade and financial
market liberalization.
They attribute the loss to EFTA to product shifting in models that have imperfect
15
competition.
See Annex 1 for a summary of the features of these models and all other individual
16
studies to which we refer later in the paper.
8
Other survey articles such as Baldwin and Venables (1995) and DeRosa (1998) do not
have a regional focus but rather describe a few articles describing results for each region. DeRosa
provides a summary table with changes in trade flows and economic welfare for studies of
NAFTA, Asean Free Trade Area (AFTA), an Asian-Pacific Free Trade Area, a greater North
American Free Trade Area, Mercosur, Chilean accession to Mercosur, and NAFTA. For all
studies that describe changes in intra-bloc and extra-bloc imports, trade creation exceeds trade
diversion. In general, there are welfare gains to member countries.
12
 
Baldwin and Venables (1995) provide a summary of the theoretical issues relating to
RTAs as well as a survey of some empirical studies.  They note that studies of EC92, which
13
removed nontariff barriers to trade in the EC (modeled as reduction in intra-EC trade costs), the
EC gains modestly.  There are small negative welfare effects on EFTA.  However, when the
14                15
EC92 is extented to EFTA countries there areg gains to both the EC and the EFTA.
Lewis and Robinson (1996) and Lewis, Robinson, and Wang (1995) developed multi-country
CGE models to analyze the potential impact of APEC and ASEAN.  Their results indicate:
16
• The formation of and APEC of ASEAN regional trade agreement would generate increases in
welfare for member countries.
• Aggregate trade creation is much larger than trade diversion.For example, see Hinojosa-Ojeda, Lewis, and Robinson (1995).
17
9
• In the case of APEC, excluding a major country such as the U.S., Japan, or China from
membership would lead to lower welfare for the remaining members as well as for the
excluded country.
• In the case of ASEAN, it is better for the member countries to include at least one large,
preferably developed country in the RTA.
• Even with the formation of an RTA, multilateral trade liberalization increases welfare for both
member and non-member countries. The formation of an RTA is thus consistent with further
multilateral trade liberalization. 
These results are consistent with many other studies surveyed.
In summary, empirical studies of RTAs using multi-country models such as CGE models
that are general enough to incorporate both trade creation and trade diversion overwhelmingly
find that aggregate trade creation is much larger than trade diversion and that the RTAs increase
welfare. While trade diversion can be shown to dominate in some analytical models, there is no
empirical evidence that this will be the case in any of the general equilibrium models examined.
Given the large body of empirical work showing that trade creation dominates trade diversion in
RTAs, Bhagwati and Panagariya, who use theoretical models that focus on trade diversion to
argue that RTAs are a bad idea, appear to be tilting at windmills of their own creation. 
Similarly, partial-equilibrium models seem inappropriate for the empirical analysis of the
net welfare impact of the formation of an RTA. For example, Yeats (1998) analyzes the effect of
Mercosur on trade in industries classified at the three-digit SITC code level. He calculates two
indices — regional trade dependence and revealed comparative advantage. He finds that
Mercosur countries have increased regional trade in commodities inconsistent with comparative
advantage. On this basis, he concludes that Mercosur is trade diverting and potentially harmful to
the member countries. However, his analysis is not comprehensive in that it does not measure
aggregate trade creation and welfare changes in Mercosur. On the other hand, all economy-wide
studies show that Mercosur is net trade creating and welfare-increasing in the aggregate.  While
17
it is useful to analyze the impact of RTAs on individual sectors, it is not possible to use such
studies to make conclusions about the impact of an RTA on aggregate welfare. 
IV. Where are the Big Numbers?
Much of the theoretical analysis of the potential impact of trade liberalization has been
done using neoclassical trade models. In this approach, the gains from increased trade can be seen
as “Ricardian” in that they arise from countries being able to pursue comparative advantage based
on having different factor endowments. Is this the correct framework to show the effects of RTAs10
or, for that matter, global liberalization? Analysis with neoclassical models seems to get the sign
right, but the magnitude wrong — trade liberalization in these models leads to welfare gains, but
empirically they appear to be too small considering the experience of countries which shifted to
“open” development strategies. The failure of the neoclassical Ricardian model to provide an
adequate empirical framework for explaining the growth of open economies provided a strong
impetus to trade economists to explore other links between trade and economic performance. The
development of “new trade theory” is at least partly a reaction to this failure, as trade economists
undertook a search for large numbers. 
In new trade theory, both theoretical and empirical models have moved beyond looking
only at neoclassical market structures to incorporate features such as increasing returns, imperfect
competition, technology transfers, trade externalities, and dynamic effects such as links between
trade liberalization, total factor productivity growth, and capital stock accumulation. These effects
are potentially large, and studies incorporating them appear to capture better the stylized facts
characterizing growth in countries that shifted from “closed” to “open” strategies. Empirical
studies of RTAs incorporating elements of new trade theory invariably find that trade creation
greatly dominates trade diversion and, usually, there is no trade diversion at all since the increased
growth of RTA members leads to expanded trade both within the RTA and between member
countries and the rest of the world. 
A. New Trade Theory
Brown (1993) and Francois and Shiells (1994) describe empirical models with new trade
theory features and discuss the implications for trade liberalization. Brown describes the evolution
of models from (1) static models with neoclassical market structures to (2) static models with
monopolistic competition and increasing returns to scale and (3) dynamic models in which
exogenous variables are updated using projected values or agents optimize production and
consumption decisions intertemporally. DeRosa (1998) and Baldwin and Venables (1995) also
consider models with new trade theory features, but do not provide analysis of the model features.
In all cases, the welfare gains from an RTA are greater as the models become more
sophisticated. When the models incorporate imperfect competition and increasing returns to scale,
for example, trade liberalization allows producers to realize economies of scale. Brown finds that
Mexico's gain from NAFTA, measured as the percent increase in real income, is always bigger
with increasing returns to scale, often by an order of magnitude. Likewise, Francois and Shiells
find that models with some form of imperfect competition yield larger results than those with
perfect competition. 
Trade externalities are another change in the production process associated with an RTA
(or any agreement which expands trade). Increased competition may induce domestic producers
to operate more efficiently. Lewis, Robinson, and Wang (1995) explore the effects of trade
externalities by linking total factor productivity in a sector to its share of exports in production.11
They find that Asian FTA is beneficial to all members when there are trade-productivity links:
GDP, absorption, and consumption all rise for all participants. 
The welfare gains of an RTA are bigger still in models that incorporate dynamics.
Modelers include dynamics either by: (1) specifying a time path for one or more of the exogenous
variables and resolving the static model each period with the new values; (2) endogenizing the
growth of some variables in the system; or (3) solving all time periods simultaneously with
intertemporal optimization by producers and consumers. As Brown (1993); Brown, Deardorff,
and Stern (1992); and Robinson and others (1993) find an exogenous increase in Mexico's capital
stock in conjunction with NAFTA leads to greater welfare gains for Mexico. As Brown notes,
“the addition of international capital flows suggests still larger welfare gains for Mexico of 4 to 7
percent (of GNP). Endogenizing productivity growth produces much larger welfare effects,
possibly in the range of 10 percent of Mexican GNP.” (p. 57).
B. Smith versus Ricardo
While the literature on new trade theory is quite large, there is unease in the profession as
to whether we have correctly identified the major effects at work. The research program is still
active and involves a continuing interplay between theory, econometric estimation, and the
development of empirical models incorporating new theoretical features. Empirical results from
simulation models such as CGE models have played an important part in this work program by
quantifying, in a general equilibrium framework, the mechanisms identified in new theoretical
models. 
As noted earlier, one of the “stylized facts” characterizing the formation of some RTAs is
a rapid increase in intra-industry trade, especially in intermediate goods. Trade-focused CGE
models capture this phenomenon by specifying that foreign goods are imperfect substitutes for
domestically produced goods, which allows two-way trade (or “cross hauling”) at the sectoral
level. Increases in intra-sectoral trade are often a major source of trade creation in these models.
But the models do not attempt to sort out the nature of such trade at the micro level. The
underlying motivation cannot really be Ricardian differences in factor proportions, since we
observe increased trade in sectors where factor proportions are similar across countries. 
We conjecture that increases in intra-sectoral trade arise from the fact that an RTA
provides an expanded secure market, and permits firms to pursue economies of fine specialization.
In North America, for example, the auto industry has become incredibly diffused, with factories
specializing in various parts located in different countries supplying assembly plants. Such
diffusion of production would be impossible if international borders represented serious and
uncertain barriers to the free flow of components. The RTA provides producers scope for fine
specialization extending beyond national markets. In this environment, efficiency gains from
increased trade in an RTA arise from economies of scale in fine specialization — Adam Smith’sNote that these productivity gains are different from welfare gains to demanders from
18
increased product diversity, as suggested by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). These “Smithian” gains
would apply to intermediate goods as well as goods for final demand. 
Wood uses this description of production in developed versus developing countries to
19
argue that factor content studies underestimate the impact imports have on demand for unskilled
labor in developed countries. They must account for the fact that differences in factor costs
between developed and developing countries mean labor per unit of output differs.




pin factory in international markets.  These efficiency gains do not arise from differences in factor
18
endowments but from the extent of the market — they are Smithian, not Ricardian:
“As it is the power of exchanging that gives occasion to the division of labor, so
the extent of this division must always be limited by the extent of that power, or, in
other words, by the extent of the market.” (Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations). 
Wood (1995) notes that production processes in developed and developing countries are
already so different, that “developed countries have become specialized producers of skill-
intensive manufactures and imports of labor-intensive manufactures are now “noncompeting” with
domestic production” (p. 65).  We extrapolate from Wood’s description of production
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differences between developed and developing countries and argue that such specialization may
also generate additional efficiency gains from an RTA. When countries have incentives to increase
trade, perhaps arising from Ricardian differences in factor endowments, and form an RTA that
provides an integrated, secure market, then there will also be incentives for producers to exploit
Smithian gains as well. From this perspective, it is shortsighted to focus on Meade-Viner trade
creation/trade diversion issues when assessing the impact of RTAs, since there may well be
potential Smithian gains not considered in the standard model. 
V. Membership Issues
Important to the theoretical debate is whether RTAs are “building blocs or stumbling
blocs” on the route to multilateral free trade.  Is there an incentive for RTAs to expand and does
20
this support or hinder further multilateral trade liberalization? A related issue is whether there is
some natural or optimal number of blocs in terms of global welfare and negotiating strategies in
multilateral free trade talks. Krugman (1993) uses an analytical model to demonstrate that welfare
is higher at small and large number of blocs, and is minimized with three blocs. Frankel, Stein, and
Wei (1995) elaborate on Krugman’s model and show that an RTA formed along natural
continental lines can also reduce welfare under certain conditions (such RTAs are termed “super-
natural”).13
Empirical models can offer some insights into these issues. In general, studies find that
there are incentives for countries to participate in FTAs. The results support the domino theory of
regionalism as described in Baldwin and Venables (1995).  Brown, Deardorff, and Stern (1994)
simulate an expansion of NAFTA, adding one Latin American country at a time. They find that, as
NAFTA expands, there are welfare gains for the new members and the welfare gains for the
included countries increase.  Similarly, Brown, Deardorff, and Stern (1996) describe the effects of
an East Asian trade bloc. They begin with trade liberalization between Japan and South Korea.
They add, incrementally, Taiwan and Singapore. They find that welfare increases for the included
partners as well as the new partner as the East Asian trade bloc expands.
Empirical models also find that the type of membership matters.  Lewis, Robinson, and
Wang (1995) analyze the implications of different memberships in an FTA among APEC
countries. They find that there are gains from making the APEC FTA as broad as possible.
Omitting any one region makes that region significantly worse off, and also lowers the gains from
the FTA for all members. Exclusion of the U.S. has the greatest negative impact on all potential
members. Furthermore, they find that all countries individually gain more from global
liberalization than they do from joining an APEC FTA alone. While the formation of a regional
RTA may be politically easier than achieving continued global liberalization, there are economic
incentives for all parties to expand on the achievements of the completed GATT round. Hinojosa-
Ojeda, Lewis, and Robinson (1995) experiment with an extension of NAFTA to include Central
America and the Carribean. They find that the U.S. and Mexico each prefers to be the sole hub,
adding “spokes” through bilateral agreements with new countries, but without full expansion of
the RTA. It is the worst outcome for either the U.S. or Mexico to be just a spoke while the other
country is the hub — they gain more from expansion of the RTA (although, particularly for the
U.S., the numbers are small). 
The U.S. International Trade Commission (1998) survey of studies of trade liberalization
among APEC countries finds a similar conclusion in studies that look at membership issues:
“ASEAN countries gain the most from the broadest possible regional liberalization.” (p. 17).
Furthermore, they note that the presence of large countries, the U.S. and Japan, is important for
other ASEAN members.
Benjamin (1994) uses an empirical model to address Krugman's description of the
relationship between global welfare and the size of an RTA. She varies the countries included in a
variety of potential RTAs. She finds that, in all cases, trade liberalization increases the volume of
world trade and generates positive welfare gains. She notes that there can be trade diversion and
that not all countries in the world will benefit. Contradicting Bhagwati and Panagariya, who claim
that higher trade dependency among potential partners reduces welfare because of tariff revenue
diverted (conclusions they draw from a theoretical model with only trade diversion), she finds that
higher trade volumes between potential bloc partners enhance benefits to bloc partners and
increase the efficiency gains from tariff reduction. They note that the Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations (CER), the
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Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUSTA), and Mercosur have all led to increased
agricultural trade with both partners and nonmembers, supporting the view that RTAs can unleash
growth in trade that benefits members and nonmembers alike.
In this analysis, they assume that producer subsidies under the Common Agricultural
22
Program (CAP) are not extended to the Central and Eastern European countries who are the low
cost producers of agriculture. 
14
VI. What do RTAs Mean for Agriculture?
Agricultural sectors are more complex in an RTA because, until recently, agriculture was
excluded from GATT negotiations. Many countries have domestic support programs for
agriculture and these programs usually conflict with trade liberalization. To the extent that an
RTA can induce countries to reform domestic support programs, an RTA encourages deeper
integration among its members.
Burfisher and Jones (1998) survey empirical studies which focus on the implication of a
variety of RTAs for U.S. agriculture. They find the following:
C U.S. agriculture can gain from participating in various RTAs. The international terms of trade
facing the U.S. in agriculture are expected to improve, with an increase in farm export prices
relative to import prices. 
C U.S. agriculture can lose when not a member of RTAs because they divert trade from U.S.
agriculture.
C Agriculture is the source of most U.S. gains from RTAs. Because agriculture still faces
relatively high trade barriers in world markets, its inclusion in trade agreements accounts for
much of the U.S. gains from RTAs. 
C RTAs limit the ability of member countries to maintain independent farm programs.
Consistent with economy-wide models that do not focus on agriculture, they find that aggregate
trade creation dominates trade diversion. Moreover, RTAs are generally net trade creating in
agriculture; and, in some cases, there is no aggregate trade diversion.  
21
Hertel and others (1997), also describe economywide models of trade liberalization with a
focus on agriculture and domestic policy distortions. They find that domestic distortions can
offset trade diversion effects. For example, as the EU expands to incorporate seven of the Central
and Eastern European countries (CEEC), the rest of the EU benefits from replacing subsidized
domestic farm output with imports from new members.  Liapis and Tsigas (1998) also examine
22
the effect of EU expansion to include CEEC. In their simulation, the CEEC participate in the EUIn their model, changes in the CEEC reflect both tariff reduction and output subsidies to
23
agriculture under the CAP which bias production towards agriculture. They note that there is an
increase in import demand for nonagricultural products in the CEEC.
15
budget and receive CAP payments. They find trade diversion in agricultural products as EU
imports from third countries are replaced by CEEC countries who now receive output subsidies in
agriculture. However, it is net trade creating in the aggregate, as they report that the trade balance
increases in all regions, except the CEEC.
23
Burfisher, Robinson, and Thierfelder (1998) examine the interaction between domestic
reforms and NAFTA. They consider the impact of trade liberalization among the U.S., Canada,
and Mexico in a model with and without domestic policy reform. In general, domestic reforms
have both lowered support levels and “decoupled” payments by making them independent of
farmers’ production decisions or market conditions. The reforms have made the region’s
agriculture more market-driven. Burfisher and others show that, in the new farm-program
environment, the change in the sectoral structure of agriculture is greater, and welfare gains are
larger compared with the effects of NAFTA under pre-NAFTA farm programs. When countries
reform domestic policies in conjunction with NAFTA, all experience welfare gains. Consistent
with other models surveyed, Burfisher and others find that trade creation greatly exceeds trade
diversion. 
The models with agricultural detail reinforce the message from economy-wide models
described earlier — trade creation dominates trade diversion. Furthermore, they show that there
are additional gains when the RTAs induce countries to reform domestic policies. 
VII. Conclusions
The theoretical debate over RTAs raises a number of issues. A fundamental question is,
are RTAs net trade creating or trade diverting? Related to that concern,
do RTAs improve welfare and if so, what are the sources of these gains? Finally, are RTAs
building blocs or stumbling blocs to increased multilateral trade liberalization?
There is a large body of empirical literature which offers answers to these questions. In
this paper, we summarize the lessons from multi-country CGE models of RTAs. We find:
C Trade creation greatly exceeds trade diversion in virtually all RTAs studied. In general,
welfare for all members increases. Furthermore, welfare for old members increases as new
members join the RTA, suggesting that there are gains from expanding the RTA. 
C Features from new trade theory such as imperfect competition, increasing returns to scale,
trade externalities, or dynamics generate big welfare gains, compared to models incorporating
only neoclassical production structures. 16
C Domestic policy reforms in conjunction with an RTA provide additional welfare gains. Models
with detailed agricultural sectors illustrate this point.
We conclude with some new leads in the search for big numbers. Empirical models
indicate that neoclassical market structures yield small welfare gains, the big numbers come when
one specifies aspects of new trade theory. We describe another type of new link between
increased trade and productivity — RTAs, which create reliable market access, will encourage
finer specialization in production. The productivity gains from increased trade in this situation are
Smithian rather than Ricardian, and represent an interesting area for future research. 17
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Table 1: Summary of Selected Empirical Studies of Regionalism
Study Country Coverage  Model Description Key Results
Western Hemisphere:
Brown, Deardorff, Canada, U.S., 23 tradable products, 6 nontraded, monopolistic There is some trade diversion as NAFTA reduces the
and Stern (1992) Mexico and an competition in non-agricultural and non-service volume of trade between NAFTA countries and the
aggregate of 31 sectors; model these sectors as requiring fixed inputs other 31 country; welfare improves for all three
other countries of capital and labor, products are differentiated by NAFTA countries (due to efficiency gains and ability
firm; set price as an optimal mark-up over marginal to exploit economies of scale in the imperfectly
cost, number  of firms in each industry insure that competitive sectors)
there are zero profits For US and Canada, gains are primarily from
SCENARIOS: (1) trade liberalization among the increased product variety; Mexican exporters gain are
US, Mexico and Canada with an increase in US concentrated in agriculture,  semi-manufacturing, and
quotas on Mexican agriculture, food, textiles and some heavy industry.
clothing; (2) (1) plus 10% increase in Mexico's
capital stock; the same two done with out Canada
Brown, Deardorff Canada, U.S., Same commodities and market structure as in (1992) there are welfare gains from NAFTA alone for those 3
and Stern (1995) Mexico (NAFTA), model countries (base case) where welfare is the EV as a %
Chile, Argentina, SCENARIOS: begin with NAFTA (tariff of GDP; in general, when NAFTA adds new
Brazil and elimination between US, Mexico and Canada), add members, welfare gains for the new member and
Colombia sequentially, Chile, Argentina, Colombia and Brazil welfare gains for the included partners increases;
scale effects of increased output mean that both factors
gain in all countries (except Chile which experience
scale gains the most in one of the most capital
intensive sectos).
Burfisher, U.S. and Mexico 28 sectors, 20 of which are farm and food processing real GDP increases slightly for both U.S. and Mexico
Robinson, and sectors; four labor categories, two land types and under tariff elimination and under tariff and quota
Thierfelder (1992) capital; 3 migration flows: (1) rural - urban unskilled elimination; an FTA generates some trade diversion
in Mexico, (2) Mexican urban unskilled - U.S. urban for Mexico, none for the U.S. but trade creation
unskilled, and (3) Mexican rural - U.S. rural; dominates; Mexico’s real GDP grows 7.4 percent
agricultural policies modeled endogenously or following the growth of Mexico’s capital stock in
exogenously, depending upon the nature of the policy conjunction with an FTA, in contrast, Mexico’s real
represented GDP increases 0.2 percent with an FTA alone.
SCENARIOS: (1) tariff elimination only; (2)tariff
and quota elimination (FTA); (3) an FTA with
removal f all Mexican domestic subsidies to farm and
food processing sectors; (4) FTA with deficiency
payment to Mexican corn farmers; (5) FTA with a 10
percent increase in Mexico’s capital stockStudy Country Coverage  Model Description Key Results
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Burfisher, Canada, U.S., 25 sectors, 18 farm and food processing sectors; trade creation exceeds trade diversion; NAFTA with
Robinson and Mexico endogenous  agricultural programs for each country; no domestic reform raises welfare for the U.S. and
Thierfelder (1998) SCENARIOS: Canada, but welfare declines in Mexico because
(1) NAFTA with no domestic farm policy reform; (2) distorting agricultural policies such as the guaranteed
NAFTA with domestic farm policy reform price for corn, remain in place; welfare gains are
bigger for all countries (and positive for Mexico)
when trade liberalization occurs in a reformed
environment.
Hinojosa-Ojeda, U.S., Mexico, 11 sectors, 4 labor categories, rural-urban migration NAFTA generates more trade creation than diversion;
Lewis, and Central America within Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean; the U.S. and Mexico prefer to be the sole hub of a
Robinson (1995) and Caribbean international migration in rural and urban unskilled regional trading system, yet it is the worst outcome for
labor categories; import structure and trade either the U.S. or Mexico to be just a spoke in a new 
externalities as described in Lewis, Robinson, and regional trading system; an FTA between NAFTA,
Wang (1995) below. Central America and the Carribean provides the best
SCENARIOS:  NAFTA and a variety of alternative outcome in terms of total real GDP and total exports
scenarios of regional integration among Mexico and for the region  (although it is not the best outcome for
other countries in the model and the U.S. and other all countries).
countries in the model; accession of both Central
America and the Carribean to NAFTA
Yeats (1998) Mercosur countries: micro-study of 128 3 digit SITC products that include Mercosur has become less internationally competitive
Argentina, Brazil, all manufactured goods, processed food and in products where trade was reorienting most rapidly
Paraguay, and processed raw materials; calculated regional toward the region; attributes this change in trade
Uruguay orientation index for each product as the ratio of the pattern to the discriminatory nature of Mercosur trade
share of export of good j in total exports to the region policies
over the share of exports of good j to other countries
out of total share of exports to other countries; and
the revealed comparative advantage index as ratio of
the share of exports of good j to the other countries
over the share of world exports of good j to total
world exports Study Country Coverage  Model Description Key Results
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Europe:
Liapis and Tsigas U.S., EU-12 ( the general equilibrium model using GTAP modeling trade diversion in agricultural products as EU imports
(1998)  12 members prior to structure; analyze the effect of CEEC-7 joining the from third countries are displaced by CEEC countries
the 1995 EU: remove all trade barriers between CEEC-7 and (these results, reflect the output subsidies to
expansion), EU-3 the EU, harmonize output subsidies and import agriculture in the CEEC countries, not just the effects
(Austria, Finland, protection, participation of CEEC-7 in the EU budget of tariff elimination); welfare for the world improves;
and Sweden), in the CEEC the gains are due to terms of trade effects
CEEC-7 (Bulgaria, which dominate the distortionary effects of CAP
Czech Republic, payments to agriculture; welfare in the EU declines
Hungary, Poland, due to budgetary cost of CAP payments to CEEC and
Romania, Slovak strong terms of trade deterioration as import prices
Republic and increase as tariffs on CEEC agriculture are eliminated
Slovenia), Newly (and the EU is  producing less agriculture so must





Trade Area and the
rest of world
Asia:
Brown, Deardorff, Japan, Singapore, Same commodities and market structure as in (1992) welfare tends to increase for the included partners as
and Stern (1996) South Korea, model;  well as the new partner as the East Asian trading bloc
Taiwan, U.S., SCENARIOS: (1) Japan/South Korean tariff is expanded; scale effects contribute to welfare gains
Canada, Mexico, elimination; (2) Japan/South Korea/Taiwan tariff and an increase in both factor returns in most
and rest of world elimination; (3) Japan/South Korea/Taiwan/ countries.
Singapore tariff elimination; (4) (3) plus relaxing
existing nontariff barriers (NTBs)by 50%; (5)(3) plus
the U.S.; (6) (5) plus relaxing existing NTBs by 50%
Coyle and Wang U.S., Canada, dynamic model in the sense that there are updates overall welfare gain regardless of liberalization
(1998) Japan, Australia, based on outside projections of four sources of approach; agriculture is a major contributor to the
Korea, Taiwan economic growth (labor force, capital stock , changes overall gains because there are high initial protection
(newly in skill composition of labor force, and total factor rates for food and agricultural. products in East Asia;
industrialized productivity growth;  Trade creation dominates trade diversion in all
economies of SCENARIOS: (1) world economic growth with scenarios, there is some trade diversion
APEC), Mexico, Uruguay round and Nafta trade liberalization; (2)
China and ASEAN APEC trade liberalization  MFN basis; (3) APEC
(all other APEC trade liberalization within the region; (4) global trade
countries) liberalization in which non-APEC members also
reform policies.Study Country Coverage  Model Description Key Results
24
Lewis, Robinson, U.S., Japan, EU, 10 sectors, two labor types, almost ideal demand formation of an Asian FTA is generally beneficial for
and Wang (1995) Asian NIEs (Korea, system (AIDS) specification of import demand which its members, although the benefits range from  quite
Taiwan, and allows import expenditure elasticities to differ from small (for the U.S. and China) to moderate (for the
Singapore), China one and also allows cross-country substitution Asian NIEs); trade create exceeds trade diversoin by a
(including Hong elasticities to vary for different pairs of countries; factor of four; all FTA members gain from the FTA
Kong) and trade externalities: (1) total factor productivity grows when they account for improved trade performance
ASEAN4 with  increased exports; (2) productivity increase and productivity, the gains are quite substantial for
(Indonesia, with increases in imports of intermediate and capital ASEAN4 and Asian NIEs; when a region is excluded,
Thailand, goods; (3) aggregate exports make physical capital it suffers losses in GDP, absorption, consumption and
Philippines, and more productive (represented by an increase in the exports, while the members of the smaller FTA gain
Malaysia) capital stock input to production) less than in the case of a broader FTA.
SCENARIOS: (1) Asian Free trade area; (2)
implications of excluding a country from the FTA —
China, ASEAN4, and the U.S.; (3) Asian FTA versus
more comprehensive free trade
Lewis and Indonesia, Same import demand and trade externalities as in an APEC free trade area provides significant benefits
Robinson (1996) Thailand, Lewis, Robinson, and Wang (1995);  to the participants, with little effect on non-members,
Philippines, SCENARIOS: there is some trade diversion away from non-
Malaysia and (1) Uruguay Round Agreement commitments for members, but total trade creation is much larger and
Singapore APEC economies;  (2) adoption of an ASEAN FTA; leads to significant efficiency gains; however, even
(together), China (3) a possible APEC FTA; (4) global trade greater gains are achieved by further multilateral
(including Hong liberalization involving areas outside of Asia liberalization; the creation of an ASEAN FTA
Kong), Asian NICs provides little benefits to its members.
(Korrean and
Taiwan), the U.S.,
Japan and the EU;
12 sectors and 2
labor types.
General Studies:
Benjamin (1994) 10 countries: US, multicountry CGE model used to  simulate the effects RTAs almost always create trade and increase global
Canada, EU, Japan, of multilateral free trade versus. a variety of regional welfare, although there can be notable trade diversion
China, Asian trade agreements formed with different combinations and not all countries in the world will benefit; large
Tigers, Australia- of the 10 countries in the model  developed countries fare best under wide-spread
New Zealand, South liberalization; higher trade volumes between potential
East Asia, Latin bloc partners means enhanced benefit to bloc partners
America and ROW and higher efficiency gains from tariff reduction.25
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